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FROM GRACE TO GRIDS: RETHINKING
DUE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR PAROLE
KIMBERLY THOMAS & PAUL REINGOLD*
Current due process law gives little protection to prisoners at the point
of parole, even though the parole decision, like sentencing, determines
whether or not a person will serve more time or will go free. The doctrine
regarding parole, which developed mostly in the late 1970s, was based on a
judicial understanding of parole as an experimental, subjective, and largely
standardless art—rooted in assessing the individual “character” of the
potential parolee.
In this Article we examine the foundations of the doctrine, and
conclude that the due process inquiry at the point of parole should take into
account the stark changes in sentencing and parole practice over the years.
Since the development of the parole due process doctrine in the 1970s, two
seismic shifts have occurred. First, the constitutional protections provided
at the initial sentencing have vastly increased. Second, the parole process
itself has been transformed by the move to evidence-based parole
guidelines and the use of actuarial risk-assessment instruments as the norm
in parole decision-making.
In this Article we document the changes in this under-scrutinized area
and assert that the liberty interest in parole should more closely match the
present-day legal account of the liberty interest that courts afford
defendants at sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
Sentencing and parole are two sides of the same coin. Both involve
figuring how much risk the individual poses to the public, and then deciding
how much time the person should serve. But when it comes to the due
process protections afforded to defendants at sentencing and to prisoners at
parole, defendants at sentencing get modern due process rights, while
prisoners at parole get barely a horse-and-buggy. The foundational law of
sentencing and parole, especially the stark differences in the level of due
process protections afforded at the front end versus at the back end of the
criminal justice system, is a product of the time when it was developed by
the U.S. Supreme Court. We think that changes in sentencing and parole
since then have made the asymmetry unwieldy and anachronistic, and that a
correction is called for.
To be specific, the Court set the pattern for its parole due process cases
back when parole was still viewed as something new and experimental. It
was a time when parole boards engaged, at least according to the lore of
that era, in a fine-grained assessment of the character of the potential
parolee. This narrative about the art of granting parole was instrumental in
the Court’s framing of the extent to which due process protections attached
to parole decision-making.
In 1979, in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex,1 the Court first examined the due process
protections that should be given to the parole decision.2 In denying that
there was a fundamental liberty interest in parole, the Court described the
1
2

442 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 3.
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parole decision as a “synthesis of record facts and personal observation
filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a
predictive judgment as to what is best”3—what the Court called a
“discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing
primarily what a man is and what he may become . . . .”4
Even at the time of Greenholtz, this system of broad parole discretion
was coming under criticism.5 To the extent that the Court’s vision of parole
was true at the time, it is not true now. Today, parole occurs in a different
landscape, against a backdrop of a shift in sentencing systems, additional
broad constitutional protections at sentencing itself, and a blurring of the
line between sentencing and parole. Further, modern parole decisions are
made with detailed guidelines and based on actuarial tables about the
statistical likelihood that a person with the inmate’s characteristics will
reoffend.
In light of these shifts in sentencing protections and parole practice,
this Article invites a re-examination of the foundations of the due process
protections provided to prisoners at the point of parole, and posits an
approach to the due process interest in parole that reflects these modern
realities.
In Part I, we describe aspects of early parole practice and the law of
due process that developed around parole. We look closely at Greenholtz,
which specifically examined the due process interest in parole release, but
we also look at the cases leading up to and following Greenholtz.
In Part II, we outline shifts in the due process protections provided to
defendants at sentencing, particularly the increased legal and constitutional
constraints placed on the sentencing process.
Taken together, Parts I and II reveal that today there are two disparate
regimes—a front-end sentencing regime which gets significant
constitutional scrutiny, and a back-end sentencing regime (parole) which
gets little. Instead of being viewed as a unitary or overlapping process that
determines how long people who commit crimes should serve, today,
sentencing and parole have become disconnected, functionally and
analytically.
In Part III, we describe modern parole practices, with a focus on the
3

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert—Counsel in the
Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1961)).
5
See Anne M. Heinz et al., Sentencing by Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1976) (noting criticism of parole reformers and that “an influential
member of Congress” had “call[ed] into serious question the assumptions on which parole
decisions are based”).
4
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decision whether or not to parole. This Part first looks at the prevalence,
even in the modern sentencing era, of parole. Second, this Part examines
two interrelated moves in parole practice—the use of parole guidelines and
the use of risk and needs-assessment instruments. Some important points
emerge. First, parole still matters. Although indeterminate sentencing may
have fallen out of favor in recent decades, most prisoners are still subject to
parole because that is the regime under which they were sentenced. Second,
the types of parole guidelines, and the types of risk-assessment tools that
parole boards use today, are quite different from the ones that were in place
when the U.S. Supreme Court laid down the doctrines that contributed to
the “deregulation” of parole. Today, most parole boards rely at least in part
on actuarial-based studies, and not on the more subjective, nuanced
predictions of human behavior that were the norm when the Supreme Court
moved to a more hands-off approach to parole.
In Part IV, we advance the idea that the due process inquiry into the
parole release decision should take into account the changes in the reality of
sentencing and parole practice. The liberty interest in the parole release
decision should more closely reflect the current legal account of the liberty
interest at sentencing; a fundamental liberty interest in parole should be
recognized.
I. EARLY PAROLE DEVELOPMENT AND DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
A. PAROLE PRACTICE

For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, parole as we know
it today did not exist.6 Criminal defendants were typically sentenced to
fixed prison terms, and early release was a matter of executive clemency.7
In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, penology became more
scientific, and the insights of psychology began to be applied to it.8 In the
6

See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 Aᴍ. Cʀɪᴍ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 303, 307–08
(2013) (stating that parole “is a relatively modern invention that came into being in the
nineteenth century along with use of a discretionary sentencing system to promote the
rehabilitation of offenders”). Parole was first adopted in 1877 in New York, and fifty years
later, all but three states had adopted parole. Id.
7
See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 Hᴀʀᴠ. J.L. &
Pᴜʙ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ 833, 851–52 (2016) (Clemency was “recognized in the English common law and
the early days of our republic. It was used regularly during the nineteenth century and for
most of the twentieth.”).
8
See, e.g., STEPHEN E. BROWN ET. AL., CRIMINOLOGY: EXPLAINING CRIME AND ITS
CONTEXT 193–95 (Janice Eccleston & Michael C. Braswell eds., 7th ed. 2010) (describing
positivism as dominating American criminology and penology in the earlier portion of the
twentieth century and tied to the belief that those who engaged in criminal behavior had a
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twentieth century, to encourage good behavior and to foster rehabilitation,
corrections professionals requested, and legislatures passed, new laws
permitting indeterminate sentencing (with minimum and maximum terms,
for example ten to fifteen years).9 The theory was that inmates should be
given the chance to earn their way to freedom.10 Indeterminate sentencing
was coupled with reward structures like good-time or disciplinary credits,
which could shorten both the minimum and maximum terms of wellbehaved inmates.11
But by far the most innovative and effective reward was release on
parole.12 Parole’s main virtue was that it provided a powerful inducement

medical illness that could be cured during an indeterminate amount of prison time and
released upon successful rehabilitation).
Parole was an integral component of the rehabilitative model that the American criminal justice
system endorsed from the end of the nineteenth century until well into the twentieth. The theory
was that new medical, sociological, and psychological theories and techniques could transform a
prison from ‘the black flower of civilized society’ into the equivalent of a hospital where
prisoners would be treated and reformed, rather than punished.

Larkin, supra note 6, at 309–10.
9
See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1315, 1321–22 (2005) (describing the federal
system before sentencing guidelines in which “federal sentences were both ‘indeterminate’
and heavily dependent on the discretion of district court judges. In an indeterminate
sentencing system, the judge sentences a defendant either to a specified term or to a range of
years, but the number of years the defendant actually serves is determined later by an
administrative body like a parole board.”).
10
Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 301–02 (1974) (explaining the implications of indeterminate
sentencing and how it allows the decisionmaker to “consider the defendant’s conduct in
prison, focusing on such factors as the prisoner’s disciplinary record and his general
cooperativeness as a prisoner,” which are within the control of the individual prisoner); see
also Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2011) (noting that, under an indeterminate
sentencing system, the release date is set by factors including the offender’s prison record).
11
See generally James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30
UCLA L. Rᴇᴠ. 217 (1982) (discussing the role of “good time” credits in indeterminate
sentencing).
12
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for
Good Behavior, 44 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON, 1, 2 (2015) (unlike other reward systems, “it is
always desirable to reward prisoners for good behavior through either positive time off or a
positive period of parole”); W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 395, 395 (2011).
First, states can use parole as a population safety valve without indiscriminately endangering
public safety, since parole boards can release only those prisoners least likely to reoffend.
Second, indeterminate sentencing gives prisoners incentives both to behave and to rehabilitate
themselves, since misbehavior and untreated risk factors will prolong their stay in prison. Parole
boards are ideally situated to make prerelease assessments of a prisoner’s risk because they can
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for inmates to conform to social norms in order to win early release.13 An
additional virtue of parole was that it extended that inducement even
beyond release, via the threat of re-incarceration for a parole violation.14 By
the second half of the twentieth century, parole was becoming a ubiquitous
feature of American penal law, in both the state and federal systems.15 By
the late 1970s, parole boards exercised authority to release more than 70%
of all the people leaving prison.16
For most of the twentieth century, parole boards maintained relatively
unfettered discretion when paroling prisoners.17 Or, as it was described in
1976, “The parole decision, as a key element of a system premised on
do so shortly before release.

Id. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of
Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 Iᴏᴡᴀ L. Rᴇᴠ. 491, 497–98, 503 (2008).
The name coined for the conditional release of a prisoner before completing a sentence derives
from the French phrase parole d’honneur, loosely translated as ‘word of honor.’ From the outset,
the concept of parole was aimed at the rehabilitated prisoner—the inmate who had exhibited
model (or “honorable”) behavior while incarcerated, professed to be a reformed person, and
accordingly proved to be a safe candidate for discharge.

Id.

13

Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 452–
53 (2005) (“Yet, some correctional experts argue that improvements in institutional behavior
and order result if the inmate believes he has something to lose by violating prison rules.”);
Mary West-Smith et al., Denial of Parole: An Inmate Perspective, 64 FED. PROB. 3, 5 (2000)
(“Inmates are led to believe that reduction in sentence length is possible through good
behavior. Adjustment to prison rules and regulations is not sufficient reason for release on
parole; however, it comprises a minimum requirement for parole and poor adjustment is a
reason to deny parole.”) (internal citations omitted).
14
See generally Tonja Jacobi, Song Richardson & Gregory Barr, The Attrition of Rights
Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 902–03 (2014) (noting that “a major proportion of
offenders failing upon reentry—and returning to prison—are doing so as a result of parole
violations and revocations”).
15
See Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIM. &
JUST. 479, 489 (1999) (“By 1927, only three states (Florida, Mississippi, and Virginia) were
without a parole system, and by 1942, all states and the federal government had such
systems.”) (internal citations omitted).
16
JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 62
(2009) (stating that “by the late 1970s, more than 70 percent of all inmates released were
released as a result of a parole board’s discretionary decision”). Nevertheless, some courts
still viewed parole as an innovation or experiment. See infra Part III.
17
See Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole
Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 396 (2014) (noting that historically,
state parole boards were “able to make release decisions with little oversight from the courts
regarding the criteria and procedures used for these decisions”); Petersilia, supra note 15, at
491 (“Parole boards, usually political appointees, traditionally were given broad discretion to
determine when an offender was ready for release—a decision limited only by the
constraints of the maximum sentence imposed by the judge.”).
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rehabilitation or ‘correction,’ is seen as a judgment (usually made by
inadequately informed decisionmakers) of whether an inmate meets some
subjective, largely unarticulated standard of ‘reformation’ or ‘recovery’
from mental or social illness.”18
B. REVIEW UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

The due process rights of people convicted of crimes vary with the
setting and have changed over time. The key case as to parole—both in
terms of the Court’s examination of the parole release decision under the
Due Process Clause, and in terms of the Court’s explanation of its
understanding of parole is Greenholtz.19 But the Court’s parole-related
decisions before and after Greenholtz give a fuller understanding of how the
doctrine came to be what it is today.
Oddly, we start with a case that is not a parole case, but that is
foundational for modern due process analysis. In Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth,20 the plaintiff alleged violations of both due process
property and liberty interests, in a non-criminal context.21 Roth set the
backdrop for the parole and sentencing cases that followed it. In Roth, the
Court ruled against the plaintiff, but it plainly acknowledged that a due
process liberty interest can extend beyond the four corners of criminal trials
and sentencing.22 In determining whether a constitutionally protected
interest was at stake, the Roth Court first rejected the outmoded “rights
versus privileges” distinction.23 In analyzing the scope of the claimed
liberty interest, the Court said the idea of “liberty” extended “beyond the
18

Heinz et al., supra note 5, at 1 (internal citations omitted). This parole story does not,
of course, reflect the entire reality of parole practice. Parole practices have varied across
jurisdictions, and within jurisdictions based on changes in parole boards, legislatures, and
political and social concerns.
19
442 U.S. 1, 1 (1979).
20
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
21
Id. at 568–69. Roth involved a challenge by a non-tenure-track professor alleging
denial of his property and liberty interests when a state university did not renew his one-year
teaching contract. Id. As to the property interest, the Court found none because the university
never promised more than one year of employment. Id. at 578–79. The Court said that to
have a property interest an individual must “have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it”
created by state law, rule, or understanding. Id. at 577; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (decided the same day as Roth, and finding a protected property
interest in “continued employment” by a state junior college professor).
22
Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (“[T]he Court has required due process protection for
deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal
process.”).
23
Id. at 571 n.9; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 266 (1970) (rejecting
distinction and finding protected property interest in receipt of public welfare benefits).
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sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process” and beyond
“‘mere freedom from bodily restraint.’”24 The Court stated that a liberty
interest is implicated when (1) a person’s reputation, honor, integrity or
good name is at stake,25 or (2) the state has imposed a stigma or barrier to a
future opportunity.26
The same year in 1972, in Morrissey v. Brewer,27 the Court found a
due process liberty interest in avoiding parole revocation.28 Before reaching
the issue of whether due process protection applied, the Court first
examined the purpose and function of parole within the criminal justice
system at the time.29 The Court noted that parole before the end of a
sentence “has become an integral part of the penological system.”30 The
Court recognized that “parole is an established variation on
imprisonment”—a process unlike the “ad hoc exercise of [executive]
clemency.”31
As to people facing a possible return to prison from parole, the Court
noted that a parolee was someone who was living and working in the
community, despite being subject to conditions of release and other
behavioral restrictions.32 The Court emphasized that a parolee was at
liberty; despite the conditional nature of his freedom, he had the ability to
hold a job and to be with friends and family.33 Given the “implicit”
understanding that a “parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he
substantially abides by the conditions of parole,” the Court found a liberty
interest, and therefore an entitlement to due process protections, in any
decision to revoke parole.34 The Court focused on whether the “individual
will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’”35 and found return to prison
from parole to be just such a loss. On the heels of Morrissey, the Court used
the same rationale to extend similar due process protections to people
24

Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 & n.11 (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
Id. at 573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
26
Id. at 573–74. Roth lost his liberty-interest-based claim because the state neither made
charges against him that damaged his reputation nor imposed a stigma that impaired his
freedom to seek other jobs. Id.
27
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
28
Id. at 488–90.
29
Id. at 477–80.
30
Id. at 477.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 482.
33
Id.
34
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479, 482–85.
35
Id. at 481–82 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
25
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facing probation revocation.36
The Court was next faced with a related aspect of parole that
challenged whether there was a protected liberty interest for someone who
was not in the community and facing re-incarceration—as in Morrissey—
but instead, facing a possible increase in the time served in prison. In Wolff
v. McDonnell,37 the Court addressed whether there was a protected liberty
interest in prison “good time” credits, which allow a prisoner to earn
deductions against his minimum (and sometimes his maximum) sentence.38
Such credits can shorten the sentence or hasten the point at which the
prisoner becomes eligible for parole; conversely, losing the credits can
effectively lengthen the sentence or delay the prisoner’s parole eligibility.
In Wolff, the Court made two analytical moves that are relevant to
parole.39 First, the Court characterized the “good time” question as one
about prison discipline, focusing on the need for prison officials to be able
to make practical day-to-day decisions for the security, good order, and
functioning of the facility.40 Second, the Court tweaked the nature of the
due process liberty inquiry; the Court asked whether there was an inherent
or fundamental liberty interest at stake, and even if there was not, if the
state had effectively created a liberty interest by statute or practice.41
On the merits, the Court rejected the argument that prisoners have an
36
See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783–91 (1973). In Scarpelli, the Court also
added a presumptive right to counsel in both parole and probation revocation proceedings, at
least where the respondent contests the facts alleged, or there are substantial reasons which
justify or mitigate the violation, or make revocation inappropriate. Id. at 790–91.
37
418 U.S. 539, 542 (1974).
38
Id. at 556–57.
39
See generally Donna H. Lee, The Law of Typicality: Examining the Procedural Due
Process Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 791–95 (2004)
(examining “the Supreme Court’s movement from the expansion of due process rights in
Wolff v. McDonnell, to the contraction of these rights in Sandin”).
40
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562 (describing prison security background to legal analysis); see
also id. at 556 (“In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.”).
41
See Lee, supra note 39, at 791–93 (stating that “Wolff marks the beginning of the
Supreme Court’s reliance on a state-created liberty interest as the basis for a federal due
process violation.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Essay, The Due Process Counterrevolution of the
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1979 (1996) (in an article critical of the Court’s 1970s
doctrine, noting the move to state-created liberty interests and asserting that this decision and
others expanded the scope of due process protections); Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty:
The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 507, 510 (1984) (analyzing Wolff as part of Justice White’s view of due
process protections in which, after being convicted and given a valid sentence, “the only way
in which a prisoner might have a liberty interest, and hence a procedural right in connection
with his custody, is if he is given one by the state”).
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inherent or fundamental right to good time directly under the Constitution.42
But the Court still found a liberty interest in good time credits because the
state statute provided a right to the credits and used deprivation of the
credits as a disciplinary sanction.43 The Court surmised that the loss of good
time credits did not (typically) cause an immediate or direct change in the
prisoner’s liberty or custody status, but only did so later and indirectly, by
virtue of the delayed parole eligibility.44 Finally, the Court noted that its
determination about the nature and extent of the procedural protections
required could change over time with changes in parole policy or in how the
law was implemented.45
In Greenholtz, the Court finally answered the question as to whether or
not there was an inherent or fundamental due process liberty interest in
parole itself.46 In examining that question, the Court described how it
understood the practice of parole as it existed at the time (in 1979)—namely
as a novel aspect of the state’s efforts to achieve its punishment goals,
grounded in a subjective, “‘equity’ type judgment.”47 The Court stated that
“the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage. In parole
releases, . . . few certainties exist.”48 The Greenholtz Court viewed the deci-

42
43
44

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–57.
Id. at 560–61.
Id.

Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be free or in prison, a
matter of obvious great moment to him. For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is
not the same immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee. The deprivation,
very likely, does not then and there work any change in the conditions of his liberty.

Id.

45

Id. at 571–72.

Our conclusion that some, but not all, of the procedures specified in Morrissey and Scarpelli
must accompany the deprivation of good time by state prison authorities is not graven in stone.
As the nature of the prison disciplinary process changes in future years, circumstances may then
exist which will require further consideration and reflection of this Court.

Id.

46

Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 3 (1979).
In 1976, the Court in Meachum v. Fano, determined that a prisoner did not have a protected
liberty interest in a transfer from one prison to another. 427 U.S. 215, 228–29 (1976). The
Court classified the case as one dealing with “conditions of confinement” in which prison
administrators needed authority to maintain order, and therefore one that was less likely to
implicate a liberty interest. Id. at 222. As in Wolff and Greenholtz, the Court looked to
whether there was a state statute or practice that mandated a certain result (like parole or
transfer) if specific factors were met. Id. at 226.
47
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8.
48
Id. But cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (describing parole as “an
integral part of the penological system” and an “established variation on imprisonment”).
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sion to parole as highly subjective—a kind of art of personality assessment
and gut instinct.49 The Court described the parole decision as a “discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily
what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has
done.”50 It said that the decision to grant or deny parole was a “purely
subjective” appraisal, in contrast to the “fact-bound” decision involved in
parole revocation.51
Importantly, the Court noted that purpose of due process protections is
to minimize “erroneous decisions.”52 This matters because under the system
that the Court describes—where there is a “purely subjective” decisionmaking process—it is unsurprising that the Due Process Clause would not
have much work to do to protect against “erroneous decisions.” There can
be no error to guard against in a process that is based on “discretionary
assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables” about “what a man is.”53
The Court made an additional distinction, contrasting people facing
parole with those already on parole, both as to their custody status and their
perceived entitlement to freedom.54 Based on its understanding of how
parole decisions were made, and on the custody status of those who were
subject to parole, the Court held that prisoners do not have an inherent or
fundamental liberty interest in parole based on the Constitution that would
give rise to due process protections.55
But, as in Wolff, based on the specific language of the state statute, the
Court reached the opposite conclusion on the question of whether or not

49

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8.

In each case, the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the
choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the
experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for
the individual inmate and for the community. This latter conclusion requires the Board to assess
whether, in light of the nature of the crime, the inmate’s release will minimize the gravity of the
offense, weaken the deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for the administration of
justice. The entire inquiry is, in a sense, an “equity” type judgment that cannot always be
articulated in traditional findings.

Id.

50

Id. at 10 (quoting Kadish, supra note 4, at 813).
Id.
52
Id. at 13 (“The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the
Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous
decisions.”).
53
Id. at 10 (quoting Kadish, supra note 4, at 813).
54
Id. at 9 (noting a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one already
has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires).
55
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7.
51
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Nebraska had created a due process right.56 The Court found that due to the
“unique structure and language” of the provision, Nebraska gave prisoners a
liberty interest in parole release protected by the Due Process Clause.57
After Greenholtz, the Court’s examination of whether the state created
constitutional interests became the norm. A few years after Greenholtz, the
Court was presented with nearly the same issue in Board of Pardons v.
Allen,58 where the state appellate court held that the parole board’s broad
discretion under the Montana statute at issue in Allen required the opposite
result.59 The Supreme Court disagreed.60 While it acknowledged that
“parole is a privilege, not a right,”61 it easily found that the mandatory
language of the statute created a liberty interest in parole if the statutory
conditions were met.62 As in Greenholtz, the law conferred a protectable
due process right, even though the board’s decision was “subjective and
predictive” and required the exercise of “broad discretion.”63 In a case
addressing administrative segregation, Hewitt v. Helms,64 again the Court
said that a legitimate entitlement to a liberty or property interest can arise
56

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12. The Nebraska statute said that the “Board of Parole . . . shall order [the
prisoner’s] release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred . . .” for one
of three specific reasons. Id. at 11 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976)) (emphasis
added). The Court relied on the mandatory language of the statute to confer a liberty interest
that triggers due process protection.
58
482 U.S. 369 (1987).
59
Id. at 371.
60
Id. at 381.
61
Id. at 377. The Court focused on language, especially the word “shall” which seemed
to create a presumption that parole release will occur. Id. at 374–78.
62
Id. at 376. The Montana statute said that “the board shall release on parole . . . any
person confined in the . . . state prison when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that
the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community.” Id.
(citing Mont. Code Ann. § 46–23–201 (1985) (emphasis in the Court’s opinion)).
63
Id. at 375–81.
64
459 U.S. 460, 462 (1983). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976), the Court,
drawing on the analysis in Roth, emphasized the limited nature of due process protections
and sought to ground these protections—in the context of property interests—in state laws,
rules, and understandings, and focusing on the change or “alteration” of legal status that
occurs at the time of the relevant decision. The Court suggested two categories of liberty
interests: those “fundamental liberties” which originate in the Bill of Rights, and other
liberty interests that are the creation of state law. Id. at 710–13. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 495–96 (1980), the Court found that involuntary transfer from a prison to a mental
health facility was a decision in which the inmate had a protected liberty interest. In
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466–67 (1981), the Court found
no inherent constitutional right and no statutorily-created right to a protected liberty interest
in the decision to grant or deny a commutation. There is no actual expectation that a
commutation will be granted, but only a “unilateral hope.” Id. at 465.
57

2. THOMAS

2017]

4/21/2017 2:28 PM

FROM GRACE TO GRIDS

225

from the Due Process Clause itself, or from state law or practice (as it did in
Wolff and Greenholtz).65 In Hewitt, the Court found that there was no
constitutional right to remain in general population, but that mandatory state
law and practice nevertheless conferred a liberty interest that required at
least minimal due process protections for a prisoner’s removal to
segregation.66
In 1995, in Sandin v. Conner,67 the Court took a big step back from the
line of cases we have just described.68 The Court self-consciously changed
the inquiry for determining whether a due process liberty interest exists,
stating that
these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by
the Due Process Clause of its own force, . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and
69
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
70
life.

As a result, liberty interests arising directly under the Constitution will get
the same protection as before (as will substantive due process rights), but
liberty interests that stem from state-created law or practice will not, other
than in exceptional circumstances. The Court’s new test was a reaction to
(1) the overemphasis on statutory and administrative evidence of a state
“right” that could make almost anything a liberty interest subject to due
65

Hewitt, 450 U.S. at 466. The Court distinguished its due process cases based on the
severity of the deprivation, the significance of the decision being made (that is, did it affect
important rights or involve merely the “daily operations” of the prison or similar routine
conditions of confinement), and the status of the plaintiff, namely whether he had already
been convicted or was only a pretrial detainee. Id. at 474–76.
66
Id. at 476. Given the wide-ranging deference accorded to prison authorities in
disciplinary matters, and the modest interest of a prisoner in staying out of segregation, the
Court held that the minimal non-adversarial procedural protections provided by the state
were sufficient. Id. at 476–78.
67
515 U.S. 472, 472 (1995).
68
See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1668 (2003)
(stating that Sandin was “a dramatic confirmation” of the Court’s shift in due process and
discussing the implications for “large-scale” inmate litigation, for example, in litigation
regarding classification and conditions in supermax facilities); Pierce, Jr., supra note 41, at
1988–89 (stating that the “Court narrowed dramatically the scope of prisoners’ ‘liberty’
interests protected by due process” in Sandin).
69
See generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress
and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1259–61 (1998) (noting that the
“lower courts that have considered procedural due process cases since Conner have indeed
had considerable difficulty deciding who has suffered an atypical and significant
deprivation,” that the Court seemed to indicate fewer due process rights for prisoners, that
the scope of prisoner’s due process rights was not obvious from this language).
70
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
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process protections,71 and (2) the worry that this emphasis would actually
discourage states from creating sensible prison and parole administrative
regimes, in order to avoid having to provide burdensome or expensive
procedural protections.72
In Sandin, the prisoner had challenged his misconduct sanction
(disciplinary segregation) for lack of due process protections.73 The Court
found the modest sanction to be a “typical” hardship of prison life: its
purpose was the “punishment of incarcerated prisoners” under a
disciplinary regime imposed by prison officials.74 The Court contrasted the
case with one in which “the State’s action will inevitably affect the duration
of his sentence,”75 suggesting that more protection might be required in that
event.
In Young v. Harper,76 the Court determined that a “pre-parole”
program, where the prisoner was released into the community, but
technically still under department control, was sufficiently like parole (as
addressed in Morrissey77) to merit due process protections.78 To the extent
that the Morrissey Court tried to draw a clear line between people who were
in custody and people who were in the community, subject to department of
corrections supervision, Young slightly blurred this line and made relevant
other factors.79 At the same time, Young reiterated the importance of the
released/non-released distinction in the Court’s calculation.80
Most recently, in Swarthout v. Cooke,81 the Court upheld the finding of
71

Id. at 481–82.
Id. at 483 (“We believe that the search for a negative implication from mandatory
language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
73
Id. at 475–77.
74
Id. at 484–85 (protecting only against “atypical” hardships and declining to protect in
this case).
75
Id. at 487.
76
520 U.S. 143, 143 (1997).
77
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (“The essence of parole is release
from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by
certain rules during the balance of the sentence.”).
78
Young, 520 U.S. at 144–45.
79
Id. at 143–44.
80
Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 887
(2000) (noting that the Court seems to have an in-prison versus out-of-prison distinction,
under which “[i]f it is about what the prison does with a prisoner in custody, then the court is
very much likely to find that Sandin applies, and there is no deprivation of liberty. However,
if it involves the release from custody, then the court is much more likely to find that Sandin
is distinguishable.”).
81
562 U.S. 216, 217 (2011) (per curiam).
72
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a liberty interest in parole, but relied, as before, on whether the state had
created a liberty interest in parole.82 In Cooke, two first-degree murderers
challenged their denial of parole under a California law, which only
required “some evidence” to support the conclusion that inmates were
“unsuitable for parole” if the board found that they were “currently
dangerous.”83 Although finding a liberty interest, the Court held that the
state’s “some evidence” rule was not a part of the federal due process
requirement, and that the minimal protections provided to the prisoners
were sufficient to satisfy due process.84
The last case that bears mention is Kerry v. Din,85 not because it deals
with parole, but because it exposes the continuing debate within the Court
about how to frame the liberty interest for procedural due process
purposes.86 Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, found that there was no
Fifth Amendment interest at stake.87 He said that “no process is due if one
is not deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property.’”88 Justice Scalia accused the
dissent of articulating a “novel theory of implied nonfundamental rights.”89
Justice Breyer, for the four dissenters, did not see the theory as novel at

82

Id. at 220.
Id. at 217 (citing In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (2008)).
84
Id. at 220–22.
85
135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015).
86
Id. at 2131. In Din, the Court examined a due process claim raised by the wife of a
non-citizen living abroad. Id. She argued that she had a constitutional right to live in the
United States with her spouse, and that she was denied procedural due process by the
government’s denial of her husband’s visa application based on a statutory exemption for
“terrorism.” Id. at 2131–32. The husband had served the Taliban in an administrative
capacity; the visa denial cited the “terrorism” provision but gave no further reasons. Id.
at 2131.
87
Id. at 2133. Justices Kennedy and Alito, concurring only in the judgment, said it was
unnecessary to decide the liberty interest issue, because regardless of whether or not such an
interest existed, the statement provided by the Government satisfied the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 2139–40 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 754 (1972)). The Court declined
to decide professors’ alleged First Amendment right to hear the views of a non-citizen
Marxist whose visa was denied; the Government had provided a “facially legitimate and
bona fide” reason for the visa denial, which was all that was required in the context of
immigration, and therefore the existence of the underlying right did not need to be addressed.
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.
88
Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011)) (per
curiam). Citing the Magna Carta, Coke, and Blackstone, Justice Scalia said that the wife
“could not conceivably claim that the denial of [her husband’s] visa application deprived her
[or her husband] of life or property; and . . . a claim that it deprived her of liberty is equally
absurd.” Id. at 2132–33.
89
Id. at 2137.
83
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all.90 He distinguished liberty interests arising under the Constitution which
trigger procedural due process protections from fundamental rights
requiring substantive due process protection.91
C. DUE PROCESS AT SENTENCING

Parallel to the Court’s cases examining the procedural due process
protections that apply within state departments of corrections, the Court has
established a very different line of cases that creates an almost unquestioned
right to due process at sentencing. The most significant of these is Gardner
v. Florida,92 a death penalty case. In Gardner, a plurality of the Court found
that the defendant was denied due process where his sentence was imposed,
at least in part, based on confidential information that was not disclosed to
the defendant and that he did not have the opportunity to refute or explain.93
The Court said that “the sentencing process,” in addition to the trial, “must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”94 While Gardner could
90

See id. at 2142.
Id. Compare Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220–22 (2005) (stating that the Due
Process Clause requires compliance with fair procedures when the government deprives an
individual of certain “liberty” or “property” interests), with Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
301–02 (1993) (stating that the Due Process Clause limits the extent to which government
can substantively regulate certain “fundamental” rights, “no matter what process is
provided”). Cf. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842
n.48 (1977) (stating that liberty interests arising under the Constitution for procedural due
process purposes are not the same as fundamental rights requiring substantive due process
protection).
92
430 U.S. 349, 349 (1977). Another relevant earlier case, though not cited by the
Gardner Court, is Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948) (finding that an inmate
was denied due process of the law, where, without counsel, he was sentenced on the basis of
assumptions concerning his criminal record that were materially false). See also William A.
McDaniel, Jr., Gardner v. Florida: The Application of Due Process to Sentencing
Procedures, 63 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1288–90 (1977) (noting that the cases cited by Gardner
were generously interpreted to find a due process protection at sentencing and noting the
Court’s break from relying on the Eighth Amendment, despite Gardner’s capital sentence).
See generally Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV.
821 (1968).
93
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
94
Id. at 358. The Gardner Court cites Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 131, 137 (1967)
(finding that the criminally accused 17-year-old petitioner was deprived of due process
where he was not afforded the assistance of counsel at a combined probation revocation and
sentencing hearing); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610–11 (reversing the convictions of
the petitioner because the Sex Offenders Act, under which he was sentenced, failed to
provide procedural safeguards, such as the presence of counsel and opportunity to be heard
at sentencing); and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521–23 (holding that a defendant
cannot constitutionally be put to death by a jury selected by purposely excluding all potential
jurors opposed to the death penalty during jury selection).
91
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have been limited to death penalty cases, it has not been.95 To the contrary,
Gardner is widely cited for the proposition that criminal defendants have a
robust right to procedural due process protections in all aspects of
sentencing.96
Most recently, in Johnson v. United States,97 the Court examined
whether a sentencing enhancement provision of the Armed Career Criminal
Act was unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause.98
The Court took it as an uncontroversial point of law that constitutional
prohibitions on vague statutes “apply not only to statutes defining elements
of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.”99 The Court held that
increasing the defendant’s sentence under the challenged provision denied
due process of law.100
These judge-sentencing cases exist with little reference to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s other due process cases, including other cases addressing
liberty interests after conviction. Scholars, likewise, have not largely given
sustained attention to this connection.101
II. CHANGES IN CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AT SENTENCING
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, as more “get-tough-oncrime” policies took hold, the length of prison sentences sharply

95
See, e.g., Stephen A. Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An
Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1638 (1980) (noting that the defendant’s sentencing interest in
Gardner was a “life and death situation”).
96
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); see also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 128 (1967);
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)).
97
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
98
Id. at 2555–57.
99
Id. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). There was
no additional discussion about whether due process protections applied at the sentencing
phase or what “right” gives rise to due process requirements at sentencing.
100
Id. (“We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required
by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement
by judges. Increasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause denies due process of law.”).
101
As a rare example, see Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and
Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 585–86 (1994) (discussing a
“nexus between sentencing and parole” in due process); see also McDaniel, Jr., supra note
92, at 1289–90 (drawing comparisons to Morrissey v. Brewer and stating that a defendant at
sentencing has a “stronger position because no authority yet has found it necessary to
incarcerate him”); Fennell and Hall, supra note 95, at 1638–39 (using Morrissey v. Brewer
and Wolff v. McDonnell to advocate for additional due process protections at sentencing).
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increased.102 Many factors contributed to the longer sentences: prosecutors’
charging practices, mandatory minimums, habitual offender provisions, and
“truth in sentencing” laws.103 While policy and statutory changes resulted in
the imposition of longer sentences at the front end, the use of parole and
how it is implemented contributed to longer prison terms at the back end.104
A. SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FACTS THAT INCREASE A
DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE

One sentencing trend that took hold was a move away from
indeterminate sentencing, like ten to fifteen years, toward determinate
sentencing—like a flat twelve-year sentence.105 Further, to calculate the
determinate sentence, jurisdictions passed sentencing guidelines, which
gave judges “ranges” for appropriate sentencing.106 These guidelines
102

The PEW Center on the States, Time Served: The High Cost, Low Return of Longer
Prison Terms (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2012/06/6/time_served_
report.pdf (reviewing state trends in time served data from 1990–2009). This data showed
that inmates in 2009 served an average of 2.9 years in custody, an increase of nine months
(or 36%) over inmates in 1990. Id. at 2–3. The average length of stay varied state to state,
with Michigan having the longest average time served. Id. at 13.
103
Id. at 23–24 (noting the variety of policies influencing length of stay, and differing
importance from state to state); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1280–83 (2005) (noting the general public’s
willingness to elect politicians who proposed longer prison sentences in an effort to appear
“tough on crime”, the imbalance in the media’s portrayal of typical prison lengths skewing
the public’s perception, interest group peer pressures from groups such as the National Rifle
Association supporting tougher sentences rather than tougher gun ownership restrictions, and
prosecutors’ desires to have “longer sentences on the book” as contributing factors).
104
The PEW Center on the States, supra note 102, at 23, 25.
105
See WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT 5–6 (Michael Tonry eds.,
2011) (explaining that from 1870–1950, though the prevailing punishment theories had
utilitarian roots supporting indeterminate sentencing, by 1980 the utilitarian ideals had
“imploded” and the “virtue and value of retributive ideas seemed self-evident” from the
writings of many penal theorists, such retributivist ideas favoring determinate sentencing);
Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 63–64 (1993) (describing moves by
state legislatures, following California’s lead in 1976, to structured sentencing and to
guidelines created by sentencing commissions, and stating that “[d]eterminate sentencing’s
principal goal has been the elimination of unwarranted disparity, with legislatures seeking
proportional punishment for different offenses and consistent punishment for similar
crimes”); see also Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and
Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1235–36 (2005) (noting concerns about arbitrariness in
criminal justice decision-making, unwarranted sentencing disparities attributed to racial
discrimination, the ripening of the due process revolution beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly,
and the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence as factors contributing to a shift
away from indeterminate sentencing).
106
See Chanenson, supra note 13, at 395–96 (describing the move to sentencing
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systems were developed for several reasons, including concerns about
disparity within jurisdictions, across different jurisdictions, and in sentences
correlated with race and gender for otherwise similarly-situated cases.107
While the federal sentencing guidelines were prominently litigated and
discussed, many states also developed sentencing guidelines that either
bound judge’s discretion within the guidelines ranges or were strongly
suggestive of the appropriate sentence for a given set of offense variables
and offender characteristics.108 Concurrent with the shift to sentencing
guidelines was a move to decrease or eliminate the power of parole
boards.109 These shifts have had important implications for sentencing and
guidelines and the “enduring challenge” of developing guidelines “with an acceptable
amount of judicial discretion”).
107
See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (“The goal of the Sentencing
Guidelines is, of course, to reduce unjustified disparities and so reach toward the
evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of
justice. In this respect, the Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a degree of
detachment lacking in our earlier system.”); see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics
of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 250 (1993) (discussing the use of “personal characteristics” to
determine sentencing and noting the requirement that “the commission’s ‘guidelines and
policy statements [be] entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and
socioeconomic status of offenders’”); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 495, 495–
96 (1990) (stating that a “major goal” of the Sentencing Reform Act was “to reduce disparity
in sentencing through a new system in which defendants with similar characteristics who
committed similar crimes received similar sentences” in addition to eliminating parole). But
see Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 916–17 (1991) (noting that researchers “who have
proclaimed sentencing guidelines successful in reducing disparity have missed this point”
and that the guidelines have not necessarily reduced disparity; they have merely been shown
to have accomplished giving similar sentences to those that are defined to have committed
similar offenses).
108
Cf. Tonry, supra note 105, at 1245 (describing state efforts in the early 1980s to
eliminate parole release, set specified lengths of sentences, and implement sentencing
guidelines). See also Rachel Konforty, Efforts to Control Judicial Discretion: The Problem
of AIDS and Sentencing, 1998 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 49, 59–61 (1998) for a discussion of
the distinctions between state and federal sentencing guidelines systems; and Neal B. Kauder
& Brian J. Ostrom, State Sentencing Guidelines Profile and Continuum, NATIONAL CENTER
FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/State_Sentencing_
Guidelines.ashx (2008) for statistics on states with sentencing guidelines. See also Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384 (1981) (upholding the federal guidelines against
separation of powers challenge).
109
Lowenthal, supra note 105, at 61 (“Two developments in the last twenty years have
transformed felony sentencing in the United States. First, most jurisdictions have adopted
determinate sentencing schemes that narrow the range of sanctions available to trial courts
and reduce or eliminate the broad discretion previously exercised by corrections
administrators and parole boards.”).
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parole.110
A common procedure in these sentencing hearings was for the judge to
engage in fact-finding about the offense and the offender, and then use
those facts (usually found by a preponderance of the evidence) to help
calculate the sentence to be imposed, whether under formal or informal
sentencing guidelines.111 A significant question that arose in guidelinesbased determinate sentencing systems was whether such judicial factfinding violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.112
Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
Sixth Amendment to cover nearly all facts that increase the actual punishment that a defendant is subjected to at sentencing.113 This line of cases is
based on the underlying Constitutional protections “against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged,”114 and that a
criminal defendant has “the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all
the elements of the crime with which he is charged.”115
The watershed case was Apprendi v. New Jersey,116 where the Court
reviewed a statute that permitted an increase in the maximum punishment if
the crime was shown to be a “hate crime.”117 The enhancement provision
increased the defendant’s sentence on the charge from a possible five to ten
years to a twelve-year term without any jury determination of the

110

See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 37, 48–49 (2005) (arguing that the transition away from parole board toward
determinate sentencing based on the federal guidelines created problems, including judges’
perception that sentences were too harsh and based on “mechanical” and “rigid” calculations
that left little room for consideration of factors that most practitioners considered relevant).
111
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 228 (1999) (expressing doubts, in the
year before Apprendi, about the constitutionality of judge findings by a preponderance that
enhance the penalty, but not ruling on the issue).
112
See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
113
But see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998) (finding
that fact of a prior conviction is not a separate crime that must be charged or determined by a
jury).
114
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
115
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995); see also United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005).
116
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
117
Id. at 495–97. The year before, the Court read a federal carjacking statute provision
that gave harsher penalties if the defendant caused more harm as defining elements of the
offense rather than as a sentencing provision, in part to avoid relegating the jury’s role to
“the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping” and to avoid the constitutional question
of whether a judge could engage in this fact-finding. Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 243–34 (1999).
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question.118 The Court found the enhancement to be a violation of the right
to jury trial and due process, and held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”119
In Blakely v. Washington,120 the Court applied Apprendi to state
sentencing guidelines.121 In Blakely, the judge-found facts were used to
depart upward from the guidelines range, and increased the sentence the
defendant actually received.122 The Court determined that “the ‘statutory
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant.”123 A year later, in United States v. Booker,124
the Court applied Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines125 and made
the guidelines advisory to remedy the constitutional violation.126 The
Booker Court read Blakely broadly, holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that the law
makes “essential to the [defendant’s] punishment.”127

118

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470–72.
Id. at 490.
120
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
121
Id. at 301.
122
Id. at 299–301.
123
Id. at 303 (emphasis in original). The Court said that the ability of the judge to depart
from the guidelines range for “substantial and compelling reasons” did not change the Sixth
Amendment analysis. Id. at 299.
124
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
125
Id. at 243–44. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, prior to Booker, required judges to
determine the guideline range and (largely) to impose a sentence within the range prescribed
by the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV) (“[T]he court shall impose
a sentence of the kind, and within the [Guidelines] range.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 &
Supp. IV) (permitting departures from the prescribed range when the judge “finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that
should result in a sentence different from that described”). The Court rejected the argument
that the fact that the guidelines were promulgated by the Sentencing Commission instead of
a legislature changed the constitutional analysis. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237–38.
126
Id. at 245.
127
Id. at 232 (describing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004)). PostBooker the Court decided a series of cases that clarify how much deference can be given to
the federal sentencing guidelines. For example, the Court said that although a sentencing
judge must “give respectful consideration to the Guidelines, Booker ‘permits the court to
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.’” Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (quoting Booker, 542 U.S. at 245–46); see also, e.g., Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007) (The Guidelines serve as “the starting point and the initial
119
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In subsequent decisions, the Court applied this line of cases to factual
findings that exposed defendants to a potential death sentence,128 as well as
extending the Sixth Amendment protection to mandatory minimum
sentences.129
The Court has somewhat limited the proceedings in which these Sixth
Amendment rights apply. The protections apply at sentencing and at
resentencing if the sentence has been vacated on appeal. But they do not
apply at “sentence-modification proceedings” (under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2)), because modification proceedings “do not implicate the
[jury-based factfinding] interests identified in Booker.”130
At least one scholar, however, has noted that the import of Apprendi
fits within our practice of parole. Professor W. David Ball advocates for a
functional reading of Apprendi and argues that this body of law “should
apply any time the jury power is infringed, including during the substantial
percentage of American sentences that terminate in a parole board’s discretionary release decision.”131

benchmark,” but judges may impose sentences anywhere within the statutory range.); Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (On appeal, the federal sentencing guidelines are
subject to review for “reasonableness,” and a sentence within the guidelines range is subject
to a non-binding presumption of reasonableness.).
128
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619, 622 (2016) (finding a Sixth Amendment
violation in the ability of a jury to issue an “advisory” opinion to judge, but where the judge
was the ultimate finder of fact in death penalty cases); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609
(2002) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation where trial judge sentenced the defendant to
death without jurors, determining aggravating circumstances that qualified the defendant for
the death penalty).
129
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2163–64 (2013) (finding that “[a]ny
fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt”).
130
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010); see also Pepper v. United States,
562 U.S. 476, 481 (2011) (holding that the defendant’s post-incarceration conduct could be
taken into account on re-sentencing and could support a downward departure from the
advisory guidelines).
131
W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing,
and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 896 (2009) (viewing Apprendi as
rooted in controlling punishment, as defined by the deprivation of liberty, and applying to
parole); see also id. at 952–56 (analyzing in the context of the California parole statute); cf.
Nancy J. King & Brynne E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits
Eligibility for Probation or Parole Release, 26(5) FED. SENT’G. REP. 287 (2014) (noting the
likely application of Alleyne to state sentencing provisions that extend the sentence that must
be served prior to eligibility for parole or probation); see also id. at 289 (stating that Alleyne
only applies to sentencing and that “delays in release eligibility that result from the decisions
of corrections officials made after initial sentencing, even when such decisions depend upon
findings of fact, are not affected by Alleyne”).
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B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS

In addition to shifts in Sixth Amendment doctrine, another sentencing
trend worth mentioning is the application of greater Eighth Amendment
scrutiny to sentences given to juveniles. In Roper v. Simmons,132 Graham v.
Florida,133 and Miller v. Alabama,134 the Court set limits on the severity of
sentences that can be handed down to juveniles. While these cases affect a
narrow set of defendants, they are significant for our purposes because,
first, they illustrate the Court’s interest in front-end sentencing beyond the
narrow area of the death penalty, and, more importantly, they show how the
Court has, in one context, incorporated considerations of parole release into
constitutional sentencing doctrine and imposed requirements for meaningful
back-end sentencing review as well, as part of the parole regime.
In Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred the
imposition of the death penalty on youthful offenders (those under eighteen
at the time of the offense).135 In reversing the Court’s earlier contrary
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,136 the Court determined that persons under
eighteen are categorically less deserving of the most severe sanction due to
their impetuosity, lack of maturity, susceptibility to peer influences, and
underdeveloped character.137
In Graham, the Court was faced with an Eighth Amendment challenge
to a life without parole sentence for a juvenile who “[did] not kill, intend to
kill, or foresee that life [would] be taken.”138 The Court found that such
persons—who had “twice diminished moral culpability” by virtue of their
youth and their lack of heightened mens rea—could not be sentenced to life
without parole.139 Instead, they were entitled to a “meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”140
In Miller, the Court went a step further, and held that the Eighth
Amendment barred the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without
parole on persons under age eighteen at the time of their offense.141 If a life
without parole sentence is possible, then the sentencing court must hold an
individualized hearing, at which the judge considers age and the “hallmark
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70, 574.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 48, 69.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 75.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
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features” of youth, the impetuousness associated with youth, the failure to
appreciate risks and consequences, the family environment from which the
youth cannot extract himself, the circumstances of the offense, including the
influence of family and peer pressure, and the youth’s limitations in
navigating the court system and fully assisting his counsel.142 The Court
allowed that a sentence of life without parole could still be given, but only
in “rare” and “uncommon” situations.143 Subsequently, in Montgomery v.
Louisiana,144 the Court found that Miller was a substantive change in the
law that must be applied retroactively.145
The most relevant case for our purposes is Graham. The Graham
Court said that the state is “not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide offense” but it must give
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”146 The Graham Court did not mandate how or
when such offenders must be given a “second look” at parole, leaving the
mechanism for that review up to the states.147 But the Court surely seemed
to contemplate review at a point or points in time long after the sentencing
hearing. While the Court conceded that some youthful offenders may in fact
spend their entire lives in prison, such a sentence will occur only if the state
later determines them to be unfit for release.148
The Montgomery Court further encouraged the perception that the
Court views parole, at least in this context, as similar to front-end
sentencing.149 The Court explicitly permitted that a state may choose to
remedy an unconstitutional mandatory life without parole sentence through
giving the juvenile access to parole review instead of resentencing.150 The
availability of parole, “ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only
transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to
serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”151

142

Id. at 2468.
Id. at 2469.
144
136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
145
Id. at 735–37.
146
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
147
Id.
148
Id. (“The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons
convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for
life. It does prohibit States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never
will be fit to reenter society.”).
149
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.
150
Id.
151
Id.
143
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Commentators, scholars, and legislatures have also seized upon the
Court’s language in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery as a signal of the
Court’s possible interest in parole review for youthful offenders.152
Some states responded to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment sentencing law by making changes to their parole review for people
who committed their crimes as juveniles. For example, Connecticut
amended its parole provisions for individuals sentenced to more than ten
years for an offense committed while a juvenile so that the parole board
takes into account a variety of youth-related criteria and whether the person
has demonstrated “substantial rehabilitation.”153 In a similar vein, California
also passed youth-specific parole legislation154 in light of Miller that, among
other things, requires the parole board to “give great weight to the
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the
prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.”155
Other states have not taken the invitation to adjust parole based on the
Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrine and are facing litigation. For example,
in Michigan, after Miller, juveniles serving mandatory life without parole
sued under Section 1983 to strike down the state’s parole statute, which
152

Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama
and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1048–69 (2014). Cohen notes that
the Supreme Court’s insistence on release mechanisms for youth facing life terms should lead to
further increases in the parole-eligible population. Current parole policy and practice, however,
have received remarkably scant attention in legal scholarship, and virtually no consideration in
the Graham/Miller literature. Without such systemic examination and, ultimately, reform, parole
may well prove to be the Potemkin village of Miller and Graham—a mere façade of relief.

Id. at 1069; Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for
Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 993–1006 (2014) (analyzing the state of Washington’s
legislative response to Miller and Graham, specifically, a bill that sought to provide youth
offenders with individualized sentencing hearings and in some cases automatic parole
eligibility).
153
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a(f)(2–4) (2015). The criteria include
correctional record, the age and circumstances of such person as of the date of the commission of
the crime or crimes, whether such person has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since
the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, such person’s contributions to the welfare of
other persons through service, such person’s efforts to overcome substance abuse, addiction,
trauma, lack of education or obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or youth in the
adult correctional system, the opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult correctional system and
the overall degree of such person’s rehabilitation considering the nature and circumstances of the
crime or crimes.

Id. at § 54-125a(f)(4).
154
S.B. 260 (Cal. 2013) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3041, 3046, 4801 and enacting
§ 3051 (2016)).
155
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (2016).
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foreclosed parole in all first-degree murder cases, as applied to juvenile
offenders.156 The plaintiffs sought a remedy requiring not just routine parole
board review, but a more robust review that would satisfy the specific
requirements of Graham and Miller.157 Initially, the federal district court
granted in part, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that
the parole statute was unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.158 In a
remedial order, the court required the parole board to decide the plaintiffs’
parole eligibility in a “fair, meaningful, and realistic” way, including—
contrary to its regular practice—that the board give reasons for its decisions.159 The court also prohibited any veto of parole by the sentencing
court (which was otherwise permitted by statute in cases involving life sentences).160 The district court’s decision was later reversed in light of
intervening changes in U.S. Supreme Court and state law.161 Similar
litigation has been pursued in other states.162
III. PAROLE AS WE NOW KNOW IT
A. SENTENCE LENGTH IS STILL COMMONLY DETERMINED BY A
PAROLE BOARD

In any given year, approximately half a million people are paroled.163
156

Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 30, 2013) (Opinion and Order), rev’d and remanded by 821 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2016), in
light of intervening changes in the law.
157
Hill, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *7–9.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at *8.
161
Hill v. Snyder, 821 F.3d 763, 771–72 (6th Cir. 2016).
162
For example, an Iowa prisoner who was resentenced to life with parole under
Graham, but who was later denied parole, sued the parole board and the state department of
corrections in federal court, alleging that the “board’s current policies . . . fail to take into
account [the prisoner’s] youth at the time of his offense and his demonstrated maturity and
development.” Grant Rodgers, Iowa Officials Wonder What’s Fair for Juveniles Felons,
USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/25/
iowa-juvenile-felons-fair-sentence/6870007/ (reporting on lawsuit); see also, e.g., Hayden v.
Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1009 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2015) (stating that in a challenge to
the parole review of juvenile offenders, the North Carolina parole board does not give a
“meaningful opportunity” for release).
163
Laura M. Maruschak & Thomas P. Bonczar, Probation and Parole in the United
States, 2012, at 8 (revised Jan. 21, 2015) (“During 2012, nearly 1 million persons moved
onto and off parole. About 496,100 adults entered parole, while the same estimated number
exited parole.”). The authors distinguish between conditional and unconditional release. Id.
Conditional release includes traditional parole: it is a discretionary decision of the board and
the individual can be returned to prison for a violation. Id. Unconditional release occurs
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Modern parole boards often have many functions, including reviewing
commutation petitions, processing automatic release decisions, setting
terms of release, and deciding who returns to prison on parole violations.164
But the prototypical decision about whether and when to parole an inmate is
still the most frequent one taken up by parole authorities.165 Imposition of
an indeterminate sentence, followed by a parole board166 release decision is,
into the twenty-first century, “the most common approach to sentencing in
the United States.”167
Discretionary release by parole boards still accounts for at least onethird and possibly close to half of all prison releases.168 Bureau of Justice
Statistics data show that of the half million people paroled in 2012, 41%
were released through discretionary parole board decision-making.169
when the board is mandated to release at a certain point. Id; see also E. Ann Carson &
Daniela Golinelli, Prisoners in 2012: Trends in Admissions and Releases, 1991–2012, at 4
(tbl. 2) (2013) (showing historical data for number of conditional and unconditional
releases).
164
See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-1-15 (2016).
(A) All applications for pardon, reprieve or commutation of sentence shall be made in writing to
the parole board. (B) When an application for a pardon, reprieve or commutation of sentence is
filed with the parole board, the parole board shall conduct such investigation as is necessary and
make a recommendation to the governor.

Id.

165

See generally Stefan J. Bing, Reconsidering State Parole Board Membership
Requirements in Light of Model Penal Code Sentencing Revisions, 100 KY. L.J. 871, 872
(2012) (“Parole boards in many states function as the final step in the sentencing phase; they
have the final word on the length of the prison sentence. . . . Currently, all fifty states have
parole boards in some fashion. However, sixteen states have cancelled the release authority
of their boards.”).
166
As an example of parole board volume, in 2006, based on survey data from 42
jurisdictions, an average 8,355 offenders per jurisdiction were considered for parole release
in that year. See Center for Research on Youth and Social Policy, Findings from the APAI
International Survey of Releasing Authorities 9 (tbl. 5) (2008) (hereinafter “CRYSP”).
167
Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 187
(2005) (citing MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 212 (2004)).
168
Gail Hughes, Parole Boards Are Worth Saving, CORRECTIONS TODAY, August 2007,
at 86 (citing APAI 2005 survey results from twenty-one states). But see 2005 Paroling
Authorities Survey, ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, (2005), http://apaintl.org/resources/
documents/surveys/2005.pdf (stating, without citation, that “33% is usually quoted as the
rate of discretionary parole in the US” but providing tabular data on which Hughes relied).
As a historical comparison, the 2005 APAI report cites to survey data from 1997 showing
that about 44% of inmates were released by discretionary parole. The number of individuals
released on parole in that year was 385,835. Id.
169
Maruschak & Bonczar, supra note 163, at 8; see also Carson & Golinelli, supra note
163, at 4 (tbl. 2) (showing that in 2012 there were c. 400,000 conditional releases from state
prisons out of some 580,000 total releases).
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Interestingly, 2012 was the first year in recent history where discretionary
board release decisions (typically in indeterminate sentencing regimes)
comprised a greater percentage of releases than mandatory release decisions
(typically under determinate sentencing regimes).170 While historically
discretionary release was the mainstay of parole boards, this study suggests
that the late-twentieth century trend toward determinate sentencing/mandatory release may have slowed and could even reverse (though it
is probably too soon to know).
Another useful measure to look at is the number of states that, at least
in some circumstances, have maintained parole board authority for
discretionary releases. A significant number of state boards have such
authority, whether those decisions are made within a system that includes
indeterminate sentences, or determinate sentences, or both.171 Joan Petersilia determined that in 2002 the parole boards in sixteen states had “full”
release authority, and an additional nineteen states’ boards had “limited”
release authority, in the sense that the board lacked authority over one or
more offenses.172 About a dozen states did not allow any parole board input
into any release decision.173 As noted above, in some states, even where
current offenders were not subject to the parole board’s jurisdiction,
prisoners sentenced before the statutory changes took effect were still
released by the board.174
170
Maruscak & Bonczar, supra note 163, at 8. See generally The PEW Center on the
States, One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections (2009).
171
Joel M. Caplan & Susan C. Kinnevy, National Surveys of State Paroling Authorities:
Models of Service Delivery, 74 FED. PROBATION 34, 35 (2010) (using 2008 APAI data to
develop information about models of state parole boards). Of course, some states that
switched from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing may have done so
prospectively, to avoid ex post facto issues—with the result that the parole board will remain
active in release decision-making until the indeterminate population is reduced to zero,
which could take decades.
172
Petersilia, supra note 16, at 66–67, (tbl. 3.1). A 2005 survey of parole boards
indicated that thirty states’ boards still had “almost full discretion or operate with some
limits,” while in sixteen states the boards had been abolished either for all prisoners, or for
more recently sentenced prisoners. See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, supra note 168
(providing a summary of responding states and a short description of the extent of the parole
board’s authority).
173
See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, supra note 168; Petersilia, supra note 16, at
66–67, (tbl. 3.1) (stating that fifteen states had eliminated parole); Amy Robinson-Oost,
Evaluation as the Proper Function of the Parole Board: An Analysis of New York State’s
Proposed Safe Parole Act, 16 CUNY L. REV. 129, 145 (2012) (citing Minnesota, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma as jurisdictions that do not allow parole board discretion with
respect to release timing and citing statutes from those three states).
174
For example, Arizona’s board has authority over individuals who committed their
felony offense before January 1, 1994; Arkansas’ board similarly has discretion over pre-

2. THOMAS

2017]

4/21/2017 2:28 PM

FROM GRACE TO GRIDS

241

Some states curtailed their parole boards in the 1980s and 1990s, but
that trend had slowed by the mid-1990s.175 For example, a 2005 survey of
parole boards found that “the move to completely abolish the parole boards’
authority ended in 1996,” although limits on the board’s authority, due to
truth-in-sentencing laws, mandatory minimums, and statutory exclusion of
some offenses, continued.176
B. USE OF GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE RELEASE DECISIONS

For those parole boards that continue to make discretionary decisions
about release, how they make their decisions has evolved since the 1960s
and 1970s (back when the U.S. Supreme Court still viewed parole more as a
new-fangled and instinctual process). Around the same time that the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Greenholtz, the move away from “standardless”
parole board decision-making had already begun, but not gained full
steam.177 To be sure, as early as the 1920s, there were some limited
attempts to use predictive tools to determine whether or not an inmate
would be likely to commit (or avoid) further crimes.178 Momentum picked
up in the 1970s to have a more uniform system of parole release
decisions.179 In 1972, the U.S. Board of Parole developed a pilot program of
guidelines for parole decision-making.180 This later developed into a
1994 cases. See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, supra note 168 (providing a list of
responding states and a short description of the extent of the parole board’s authority).
175
Hughes, supra note 168, at 86–87 (stating that parole boards were abolished in the
1980s to mid-1990s but after 1996, while parole board authority was circumscribed in some
jurisdictions, no other boards were outright abolished).
176
See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH. INT’L, supra note 168, at 12 (describing the types of
limits placed on responding states’ parole boards).
177
See Cohen, supra note 152, at 1070; Ariela Gross, History, Race, and Prediction:
Comments on Harcourt’s Against Prediction, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 236 (2008)
(“California and the federal government adopted actuarial instruments in the 1970s, and
twenty-six other states followed by 2004. This trend coincided with the relative demise of
parole.”); Russell L. Jones, Bernard E. Harcourt’s Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing,
and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2006), 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 219, 222 (2007).
By 1961, parole boards in only two states were using predictive methods. However, in the 1970s,
the actuarial approach became more widely accepted. Peter B. Hoffman, director of research, and
James L. Beck, a research assistant at the United States Board of Parole developed the Salient
Factor Score as an aid in predicting parole performance. The instrument was developed from the
Burgess model, but it reduced the number of factors from twenty-one to nine and later to seven,
and focused heavily on prior criminal history.

Id.

178

Heinz et al., supra note 5, at 2 (“The development of prediction tables started in the
1920’s, and Illinois prison officials adopted them in 1933.”).
179
See Cohen, supra note 152, at 1070.
180
James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of Ex Post Facto Principles to
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guideline table used by the U.S. Parole Board.181 At least some of these
guidelines were not meant to change paroling behavior or to better predict
recidivism, but rather were codifications of existing practice so that
decisions would be more uniform across decision-makers. The firstgeneration tools of prediction available at the time were criticized as
inaccurate, tending to err in favor of keeping people in custody,182 and
deeply rooted in the “seriousness” of the prisoner’s offense in comparison
to other salient factors.183
Under modern practice, parole boards overwhelmingly use decisionmaking instruments like parole guidelines to help them to decide whom to
release. In a 2008 survey of parole authorities, over 80% used written
guidelines or other decision-making tools, of which 88% included a formal
scoring process.184 In raw numbers, thirty-six of the forty-four states
responding to the survey used a decision-making instrument.185 Few parole
boards need outside authority for the development or use of these
instruments.186
Parole guidelines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some
jurisdictions, the guidelines are largely suggestive or advisory—they list a
number of factors that the promulgating authority believes to be relevant to
the release decision. The guidelines are used to funnel the discretion of the
decision-maker,187 and to attain greater consistency from board member to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines After United States v. Booker, 110 W. Vᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ.
1033, 1057–58 (2008).
181
Heinz et al., supra note 5, at 3 (“In effect, the Federal Parole Board’s goal was to
institutionalize its own past decision-making behavior by determining by a process of
induction what its decision rules had been, and then publishing those rules as ‘guidelines’ for
future decisions.”).
182
Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1409–11 (1979)
(discussing the two fundamental questions regarding the use of predictions in law—whether
they are accurate and if accurate, whether they are legitimate to use).
183
See Petersilia, supra note 15, at 491.
184
CRYSP, supra note 166, at iv, 12 (2008) (summarizing key findings of U.S.
jurisdictions related to the release decision process and describing this finding).
185
See id. at 13 (tbl. 10) (“Use of Decision-Making and Risk Assessment Instruments”).
186
See id. at 12 (stating that only three releasing authorities “need[ed] outside approval
for these instruments”).
187
See Petersilia, supra note 15, at 497–98.
Parole guidelines are usually actuarial devices that predict the risk of recidivism based on crime
and offender background information. The guidelines produce a “seriousness” score for each
individual by summing points assigned for various background characteristics (higher scores
mean greater risk). Inmates with the least serious crime and the lowest statistical probability of
reoffending would then be the first to be released. The use of such instruments helps to reduce
disparity in parole release decision making and has been shown to be more accurate than release
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board member or panel to panel. Other states’ parole guidelines provide
much more structure. In Georgia, for example, inmates are given a “risk to
re-offend score” based on a numerical calculation that includes previous
felony convictions, prior incarcerations, current offense, age at admission,
history of drug or alcohol abuse, and employment status at the time of
arrest.188 This “score” is then combined with the “crime severity level” of
the offense of conviction to generate a parole guideline recommended term
of incarceration.189 The guidelines recommendation typically takes the form
of a range of months within the indeterminate sentence.190
Whether or not parole guidelines are statutorily binding (or boards are
otherwise required to follow them), they have a significant impact on who
is granted parole. For example, a change in the parole grant rate in Texas—
from 29% in September 2010 to 42% in February 2012—has been
attributed to changes in the state’s parole guidelines that redefined risk
categories.191
Parole guidelines typically are drafted so as not to establish a
presumption of parole. This parallels most underlying statutory and
regulatory parole schemes, which also tend not to create a right to parole.192
(There is, however, an incipient movement towards presumptive parole, as
states struggle to reduce their outsized prison populations in order to cut
corrections costs.)193 But states are cognizant of existing U.S. Supreme

decisions based on the case study or individualized method.

Id.; Victoria L. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole
Boards, 45 S.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 567, 613 (1994) (“Guidelines inform the inmates of what
information would be relevant to present at the hearing. With sufficient opportunity for
departure, the guideline’s criteria provide a means of accomplishing uniformity,
proportionality, and predictability without unduly fettering appropriate exercise of a parole
board’s discretion.”).
188
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05(8) (2012); see Marsha L. Levick & Robert G.
Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court and Before
the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 407–08 (2013) (analyzing the provisions of the
Georgia Parole Board Guidelines in the context of youthful offenders).
189
See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05(9)–(17) (detailing “Crime Severity Level”
offenses and recommended sentences based on combined severity level and “risk to reoffend score”).
190
Id.
191
The PEW Center on the States, supra note 102, at 25.
192
See, e.g., GA. COMP. R & REGS. 475-3-.05(5) (stating that the state regime “does not
create a liberty interest”); Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Policy Directive 06.05.100 at 1
(11/01/08) (stating that “a parole guideline score in the high probability range does not create
a right for the prisoner to be paroled”); see also Robinson-Oost, supra note 173, at 133.
193
See, e.g., H.B. 4138, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2015 (Mich. 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. §
47-7-18 (2011) (creating presumptive parole if prisoner meets certain conditions).
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Court precedent194 and are careful to state that their guidelines do not create
a right to parole that might be interpreted as a liberty interest enforceable
under the Due Process Clause.195
C. USE OF RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS FOR RELEASE
DECISIONS196

States have also adopted risk and needs assessment instruments in
response to pressure to develop “evidence-based” parole systems and to
improve their decision-making.197 “Since the 1970s, parole authorities have
moved away from traditional ‘pen and paper’ clinical evaluations conducted
by correctional or parole personnel toward automated, actuarial-based risk
and needs assessments, which are believed to more accurately predict
recidivism.”198 These instruments rely on aggregate statistics and develop
actuarial tools that examine the statistical relationship between variables
about individuals and likelihood of risk outcomes.199 But there are still
value judgments at play–—such as how much risk is tolerable. Further, in
these judgments, some suggest that parole boards still “err on the side of
severity.”200
194

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 (1995).
See GA. COMP. R & REGS. 475-3-.05(5); Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Policy
Directive 06.05.100 at 1 (11/01/08).
196
Edward J. Latessa & Brian Lovins, The Role of Offender Risk Assessment: A Policy
Maker Guide, 5 VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 203, 212 (2010); Memorandum from the Vera
Institute of Justice’s Center of Sentencing and Corrections to the Delaware Justice
Reinvestment Task Force, 9–12 (October 12, 2011). https://ltgov.delaware.gov/taskforces/
djrtf/DJRTF_Risk_Assessment_Memo.pdf.
197
See generally Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual
Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 9 (2015) (describing the creation and use
of actuarial risk tools); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk
Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (defining actuarial risk assessment as a method “which employs
empirically derived ‘mechanical’ rules for combining information to produce a quantitative
estimate of risk”).
198
Cohen, supra note 152, at 1070. See generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball
Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671 (2015).
199
See generally Hamilton, supra note 197, at 9 (describing development of actuarial
tools).
200
See, e.g., YVONNE JEWKES & JAMIE BENNETT, DICTIONARY OF PRISONS AND
PUNISHMENT 56 (2008) (explaining that parole boards “err on the side of caution when
assessing and predicting dangerousness” because the prediction of human behavior can
never be “100 percent” and the media encourages public opinions that favor imprisoning
dangerous offenders for long time periods to “keep them off the streets”); cf. Beth
Schwartzapfel, Parole Boards: Problems and Promise, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 79 (2015).
195

The growing movement for criminal justice reform has had little effect on the politics of the
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The use of risk and needs assessment tools by parole authorities is
significant, and increasing.201 In recent years, several state legislatures have
passed laws requiring the use of risk and needs assessments across a
number of points in the criminal justice process, including at parole
release.202
A number of reports provide distinct lenses on overall trends. A 2008
report found that thirty-two of thirty-seven responding states were using
some kind of risk assessment instrument as part of the parole process.203 Of
those thirty-two states, the majority used their own risk assessment tool,
developed in house.204 Another study, which examined parole board statutes
and online information, reported that twenty-four states use a riskassessment tool in parole release decisions.205
There are a number of well-regarded and widely-used risk-assessment
instruments from which to choose. Based on a survey of parole boards, the
most commonly used risk-assessment tool for a general population of
prisoners was the LSI-R, Level of Service-Revised, which was used by 12
states.206 Another commonly used tool was the Static-99, a sex-offendercountry’s parole boards. A months-long Marshall Project investigation revealed that parole
boards remain so deeply cautious about releasing prisoners that in many states they let go only a
fraction of those eligible, and almost none who are violent offenders—even those who pose little
danger and whom a judge clearly intended for eventual release.

Id.; Michael Meltsner, The Dilemmas of Excessive Sentencing: Death May Be Different But
How Different?, 7 NE. U. L.J. 5, 16 (2015) (“Parole boards, when they exist, are heavily
influenced by politics and media. The idea of running prisons with rehabilitation foremost in
mind has been rejected by the public and many professionals.”).
201
See also Pari McGarraugh, Up or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical Risk
Assessment is Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropriate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1079, 1081 (2013) (arguing that risk assessments should be used, as suggested by a draft
Model Penal Code proposal at sentencing, and critiquing the use of risk assessments at
parole, in part, because of the lack of procedural protections).
202
See National Conference of State Legislatures, E-Bulletin: Sentencing and
Corrections Policy Updates, Issue 6, at 2–4 (Jan. 2012) (stating that in 2011, at least six state
legislatures required use of risk and needs assessments; describing New Hampshire, South
Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio as states where the instrument is used across stages of the
criminal system, including at the parole board; and stating that Louisiana and New York
require the assessments for parole); see also Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing:
Are We Up to the Task?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 157 (2010) (reporting that in at least ten
states, sentencing judges use risk assessment instruments).
203
CRYSP, supra note 166, at 12–13 (tbl. 10).
204
Id. at 13 (tbl. 10) (indicating that eighteen release authorities use in-house risk
assessment tools).
205
Robinson-Oost, supra note 173, at 144. This study notes the difficulties of using only
publicly available information and suggests that the higher numbers found in the direct
survey of parole boards comes closer to the actual figure. Id. at 143.
206
CRYSP, supra note 166, at 12 (tbl. 10).
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specific tool, which was used by seventeen of the thirty-two states.207
The extent to which risk-assessment tools inform, or even direct, the
parole board’s decision varies. For example, in Nevada, the assessment tool
generates a simple risk score as to the likelihood that the prisoner will
commit a felony on parole: low, moderate, or high.208 This risk score,
together with a score for the severity of the underlying offense, provides
“an initial assessment regarding whether to grant parole.”209 Then the parole
board can look at an additional list of aggravating and mitigating factors
before making a release decision.210
What sets such modern parole decision-making apart from the more
subjective decision-making that dominated parole in the second half of the
twentieth century is that the risk-assessment instruments themselves are not
attempting to predict the individual prisoner’s risk of re-offending,211 a fact
that is sometimes obscured or misunderstood.212 Rather these are actuarialbased instruments that look at recidivism rates for people who share the
same characteristics as the potential parolee.213 The instruments are based
207

Id.
Robinson-Oost, supra note 173, at 146. (citing Nevada example, but incorrectly
stating—at least under present law—that the state relies exclusively on a risk assessment
tool, while in fact the tool simply generates an initial assessment). See NEV. ADMIN. CODE §
214.514 (2014).
209
NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 214.516 (2014).
210
NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 213.518 (2014). Nevada does not make its risk assessment tool
information public, but a look at the list of aggravating factors in NEV. ADMIN. CODE §
213.518 (2014) suggests that some aspects of an inmate’s history, such as prior convictions
could be “double counted” both in the assessment tool and in the additional aggravating
factors. Id.
211
See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary
Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000) (“In the past several years, the
field of “violence risk assessment” has seen a dramatic shift away from studies attempting to
validate the accuracy of clinical predictions, and toward studies attempting to isolate specific
risk factors that are actuarially (meaning statistically) associated with violence.”). See
generally John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 Vᴀ. L. REV. 391 (2006) (comparing and contrasting
clinical (i.e., subjective) risk assessment with actuarial-based risk assessment tools. These
tools have been criticized for a number of reasons, including that some decision makers
incorrectly perceive that the tools are making individualized predictions.).
212
E.g., Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science:
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 Tᴇᴍᴘ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 697, 749
(2011) (“[I]t is clear that many experts and courts have erroneously interpreted the actuarial
tools and their purposes. . . . The first, which is quite common among the cases, is the
improper interpretation that group-based scores provide risk-assessment estimates that are
individualized to specific defendants.”).
213
See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806–07 (2014). Starr notes that:
208
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on numerous static factors that have been studied and refined across large
populations over time.214 For example, the STATIC-99 (used to score male
sex offenders) looks at ten factors, including categories such as age, prior
sex offenses, prior non-sex offenses, long-term relationships, and victims
who are strangers.215 The researchers who design these instruments have
collected data over time on thousands of sex offenders for whom these
categories have been charted.216 The researchers can then analyze the data
to see which factors correlate to recidivism over time, and which factors
deserve more or less weight.217 The best instruments are regularly being
refined and recalibrated (and the factors changed or re-weighted), as each
passing year for each sample population produces more and better data.218
To be sure, these types of instruments have been subject to criticism, not
just for the use of imperfect data, but also for concern that the factors used
will have disparate results based on race and socioeconomic status,
unrelated to the actual risk of future criminality posed by the individual.219

[T]he instruments provide nothing close to precise predictions of individual recidivism risk. The
underlying regression models may provide reasonably precise estimates of the average
recidivism rates for the group of offenders sharing the defendant’s characteristics, but the
uncertainty about what an individual offender will do is much greater, and when it comes to
predicting individual behavior, the models offer fairly modest improvements over chance. While
[evidence-based sentencing] literature sometimes acknowledges this limitation, most advocates
have downplayed its seriousness, and existing scholarship has not recognized its legal import.

Id.

214

Hamilton, supra note 212, at 720.

The general idea for actuarial ratings for any risk at issue is to identify those factors that are
correlative to the potential occurrence of the future event at issue, and to effectively assign
appropriate weights to each factor based on the observation that some factors have greater
correlative abilities than others relating to the particular result. The theory is that a better model
of prediction should be based not on any single risk factor, but an accumulation of relevant risk
factors.

Id.

215

See generally, R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Static 99: Improving Actuarial
Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders 1999–2002, Sol. General Canada (1999).
216
In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ill. 2004) (“The Static–99 is
based upon a study of thousands of sex offenders from England, Canada, and the United
States.”).
217
See generally Amy Phenix, et al., Static–99 & Static–2002R Evaluators’ Workbook
(Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/.
218
See e.g., Gregory DeClue & Denis L. Zavodny, Forensic Use of the Static-99R: Part
4. Risk Communication, 1 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT MGMT. 145, 146 (2014) (describing
evolution of Static-99).
219
See, e.g., Starr, supra note 213, at 836–41 (arguing that the disparate impact of
evidence-based sentencing on racial minorities and offenders of lower socioeconomic status
may be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Janus & Prentky, supra note
197, at 1487.
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What such instruments bring to parole boards is not predictive
certainty about what any individual prisoner will do in the future, but rather
scientific evidence about how prisoners with the same or similar risk-factor
profiles have fared in the past, and therefore how statistically the prisoner
under review is likely to fair in the future. The subjective “art” of parole
decision-making has been criticized as being little better than flipping a
coin.220 Risk-based decision-making acknowledges that individual predictive judgments are unreliable, and relies on large-scale statistical sampling
instead. Even if parole decision-making remains partially an “art” under
modern practice, the science of statistics provides parole decision-makers
with far more, and far better information than they had in the past.221

There are three potential sources of prejudice from [actuarial risk assessment] testimony. First,
there is concern that the scientific and statistical nature of actuarial assessments will unduly
influence the fact-finder into giving it more weight and credibility than it deserves, and that the
principle of “actuarial superiority” will exacerbate this tendency. The corollary is that the
weaknesses of some ARA instruments are too complex for lay fact-finders to apprehend. Second,
some worry that juries will ignore the lack of “fit” between the actuarially derived risk and the
legally relevant risk, thus giving ARA too much weight. Third, in the words of Professor Tribe,
the “incriminating significance” of statistical probabilities is obscure.

Id.

220

See Seena Fazel, Coin-flip Judgment of Psychopathic Prisoners’ Risk, Nᴇᴡ
Sᴄɪᴇɴᴛɪsᴛ, (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22029464-800-coin-flipjudgement-of-psychopathic-prisoners-risk (highlighting the over-reliance on inherently
fallible and flawed assessment tools used by officials in the U.S. and Canada to predict
prisoner failure (i.e., risk of reoffending) upon parole or release, especially so for prisoners
with psychopathy); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 693, 695–97 (1974) (arguing
against allowing expert testimony in commitment proceedings, challenging the presumption
of the reliability and validity of psychiatric judgments, and characterizing such judgments
and diagnoses as inherently unreliable, particularly predictions of a person’s propensity for
future violence or dangerousness).
221
Most parole board members believe that they make better decisions as they gain
experience, and that getting to know individual prisoners is important to good decisionmaking. Of course, investment fund managers have similar ingrained beliefs, despite studies
showing that over time market-indexed funds beat nearly all stock pickers—regardless of
their experience or the information they possess. See BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK
DOWN WALL STREET 178–86 (Norton & Company 1999 (1973)). Having the ability to
exercise discretion in parole makes intuitive sense, at least at the margins. There will always
be a few prisoners who score very low on recidivism metrics, but whose turnaround in prison
is so apparent that the risk of release is worth taking; the reverse is also true, a few prisoners
with superb guideline scores will have persistent character or behavioral deficits that make
the risk of release not worth taking.
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IV. HOW MODERN PAROLE AND SENTENCING PRACTICE INFORMS THE
LEGAL PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE UNDER MODERN PAROLE.
We think that due process doctrine regarding parole was developed in
a different era, and that today the doctrine fails to account for the sea
change in both sentencing practice and parole practice over the years. We
fail to see why the due process protections provided at the point of parole
should not closely parallel the due process protections provided at sentencing, given that the practical liberty interests are identical and the decisional
processes are similar in both situations. In both settings, the decision-maker
must decide exactly the same questions, namely how much risk does the
defendant/prisoner pose, and how long should the defendant/prisoner serve?
We take as a given—and take seriously–—that the procedural
protections afforded to criminal defendants at sentencing, and prisoners at
parole, regarding how long they will serve should derive organically from
the realities of sentencing and parole. But where, as here, both sentencing
and parole have shifted seismically since the development of the respective
due process doctrines, those shifts should call into question the soundness
of the doctrinal structure that was formed and erected on what today are
outdated understandings of sentencing and parole practice. As noted earlier,
the Greenholtz Court characterized the nature of the parole decision as
“subjective,” and described the purpose of due process as to minimize
“erroneous decisions.”222 When the parole decision hinges on subjective
insight into the character of the individual, it stands to reason that the Court
would not see a fundamental liberty interest, and would only find one if the
state had explicitly created one. But the near universal reliance on parole
guidelines and risk assessment instruments (even if some attendant discretion remains to depart from these norms), demand, at a minimum, that the
state be seen as creating a system which provides an entitlement to the fair
and consistent application of this structured process, and to outcomes consistent with the outputs of the chosen metrics.
The changes in sentencing law, and the thin distinctions between the
total amount of punishment, the amount of punishment imposed at
sentencing by the judge, and the amount of punishment imposed by the
parole board, make anachronistic the siloing of parole into a separate
category that is unworthy of due process protections. The due process
protections extended (or not extended) at parole should reference, if not
parallel, the protections extended (or not) at sentencing. Courts assume that
222

Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979) (“The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and
in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”).
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there is a constitutionally-protected liberty interest at the imposition of a
sentence because the defendant will be deprived of liberty for X time, but
exactly the same decision is being made by the board at the point of parole.
We think the two liberty interests are functionally indistinguishable and that
a liberty interest should be recognized at the parole release decision.
We note that recognizing a liberty interest in parole is, of course, not
the end of the analysis when examining whether a failure to give certain
procedural protections violates due process. Once a court determines that a
liberty interest is present, the question is then “What process is due?”223
Shifting this inquiry puts the focus on the harder, but more relevant,
question.224
We also note that such a shift would not undermine the analysis for the
due process protections afforded for conditions of confinement. Rather we
suggest that there should be a more unitary due process standard for
decisions that determine the length of confinement.
We are not the first scholars to note the inconsistency of applying due
process at sentencing, but not applying it at the point of the parole release
decision. Professor Ball notes:
[I]t seems absurd to hold that due process obtains during the sentencing process,
which governs the prospective duration of restrained liberty, but that [at parole] it is
no restraint on the actual length of time those in prison will spend there. Nor does it
make sense to hold that a parolee enjoys due process protections once she has been
conditionally released, but that she has no protections during the hearing that
determines whether or when she will be granted that conditional release. An offender
cannot have inherent due process interests in both of these stages but not in parole
225
suitability itself.

Nor is our view of linking the punishment imposed at sentencing with
the punishment later imposed at parole without precedent. The draft of the
Model Penal Code, currently under consideration, moves in its own way to
erase the line between initial sentencing and parole release.226 One of the
proposed Model Penal Code sections on sentencing provides principles for
a new regime of “second look” sentencing, which would be conducted by
223

See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571–72 (1974).
Instead of, for example, encouraging gamesmanship about statutory wording, see,
e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995) (“[W]e believe that the search for a
negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the
real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
225
Ball, supra note 131, at 957.
226
Kevin R. Reitz, Modification of Long-Term Prison Sentences; Principles for
Legislation, MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.6, sentencing (Tentative Draft No. 2 2011) at 75–77
(providing principals for “second look” sentencing); cf. id. at § 6.06(4) and (5) (determinate
sentencing).
224
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judges after the defendant has served fifteen or more years in prison.227 The
proposals, in tandem, recommend the prospective elimination of parole
board release.228
CONCLUSION
Context matters. The U.S. Supreme Court’s choice to provide little to
no independent due process protections for parole release decisions was
based, in part, on a view of parole as an art of standard-less discretion, and
at a time when the criminal justice system provided very little constitutional
protection or structure even for front-end sentencing decisions. This world
no longer exists. Now, constitutional sentencing doctrine is a robust area of
law that, in some instances, acknowledges the relationship between sentencing after conviction and parole release decisions. Those parole release
decisions, once based on gut intuition about “what a man is,” are now based
on parole guidelines and actuarial risk and needs assessments. If the
purpose of due process protection is, as Greenholtz asserted, to minimize
“erroneous decisions,”229 these shifts in context call for a change in our
understanding of the extent of due process protection for the parole release
decision.

227
See id. § 305.6, at 75–77; Margaret Colgate Love & Cecilia Klingele, First Thoughts
About “Second Look” and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code:
Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 859, 873 (2011).

As the commentary to proposed Section 305.6 explains, the purpose of this “second look”
provision is twofold. First, it recognizes that the United States makes “heavy use of lengthy
prison terms—dramatically more so than other Western democracies.” Although the provision
has sparked some difference of opinion among Institute members, in terms of both sentencing
theory and institutional competence, there now appears to be consensus that courts must have
some power to reexamine a lengthy sentence after a period of years, particularly if the public
mood that produced a particularly harsh sentence has mellowed or the overall legal environment
has changed. The second motivation is normative, and focuses more on the circumstances of the
particular prisoner than on the external environment.

Id.

228

See Reitz, supra note 226, at Appendix B, Reporter’s Study: The Question of ParoleRelease Authority (eliminating parole board release authority). We applaud the creativity of
the Model Penal Code proposals, but we also strike a note of caution. Although eliminating
parole board authority could support a “second-look” sentencing system, based on our own
experience in Michigan, when (elected) judges are empowered years after the initial
sentencing to revisit, modify, or resentence long-term prisoners, we have not seen the kind of
fair, uniform, transparent, and consistent results that professional parole boards can strive to
produce.
229
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979).
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